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People are particularly sensitive to injustice. Accordingly, deeper knowledge regarding the processes that underlie the perception of injustice,
and the subsequentdecisions toeitherpunish transgressorsor compensatevictims, isof important social value.Bycombininganoveldecision-
making paradigm with functional neuroimaging, we identified specific brain networks that are involved with both the perception of, and
response to, social injustice, with reward-related regions preferentially involved in punishment compared with compensation. Developing a
computational model of punishment allowed for disentangling the neural mechanisms and psychological motives underlying decisions of
whether to punish and, subsequently, of how severely to punish. Results show that the neural mechanisms underlying punishment differ
depending on whether one is directly affected by the injustice, or whether one is a third-party observer of a violation occurring to another.
Specifically, the anterior insula was involved in decisions to punish following harm, whereas, in third-party scenarios, we found amygdala
activity associated with punishment severity. Additionally, we used a pharmacological intervention using oxytocin, and found that oxytocin
influenced participants’ fairness expectations, and in particular enhanced the frequency of low punishments. Together, these results not only
providemore insight into the fundamental brainmechanismsunderlying punishment and compensation, but also illustrate the importance of
taking an explorative,multimethod approachwhen unraveling the complex components of everyday decision-making.
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Introduction
People typically have strong reactions to what they perceive as
injustice. In fact, violations of social norms, standards of behavior
that are based on widely shared beliefs about how one should
behave, not only trigger an emotional response in the “victims” of
such violations, but can also lead to strong responses from third-
parties observing the situation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004;
Chavez and Bicchieri, 2013).
Recent neuroimaging work has greatly advanced our under-
standing of how the brain responds to social norm violations. These
studies highlight the role of reward- and emotion-related processes
in punishment as well as in compensatory decision-making, where
the latter refers to the allocation of resources to someone who has
been the victim of a violation (Sanfey et al., 2003; Treadway et al.,
2014). To date, however, most research has focused on punishment
and very few studies have directly compared punishment and com-
pensation decisions at the neural level (Hu et al., 2015, 2016). There-
fore, the extent to which the biological mechanisms underlying
punishment and compensation are either similar to, or different
from, each other remains elusive. Our first aim, accordingly, is to
unravel the neural mechanisms underlying decisions to punish
transgressors and compensate victims.
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Significance Statement
Theperception of injustice is a fundamental precursor tomanydisagreements, fromsmall struggles at the dinner table towasteful
conflict between cultures and countries.Despite its clear importance, relatively little is knownabout how thebrainprocesses these
violations. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, we combinemethods fromneuroscience, psychology, and economics to explore
the neurobiological mechanisms involved in both the perception of injustice as well as the punishment and compensation deci-
sions that follow. Using a novel behavioral paradigm, we identified specific brain networks, developed a computational model of
punishment, and found that administrating the neuropeptide oxytocin increases the administration of low punishments of norm
violations in particular. Results provide valuable insights into the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms underlying social
injustice.
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The next aim of this study focuses more closely on punish-
ment of transgressors. Recent neuroscientific work suggests that
punishment is not a single, unitary, process, but rather comprises
distinct subcomponents (Krueger and Hoffman, 2016). How-
ever, studies to date have predominantly focused on disentan-
gling these subcomponents in so-called third-party punishment
situations where others are in the role of victims, and participants
administer punishments to the transgressor. Research examining
second-party punishment, where participants are directly affected, is
exceedingly scarce (Strobel et al., 2011). This aim therefore will
compare the neural processes underlying both second- and third-
party punishment, and specifically identify the motives underly-
ing decisions to punish and, subsequently, of how much to
punish, across both types of contexts.
Understanding the motives underlying these two decision
components—whether, and how much, to punish—is nontriv-
ial. One account of punishment in response to unfairness posits
that punishment is driven by social preferences for equitable out-
comes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). However, alternative accounts
suggest that affective experiences, such as anger, envy, or retalia-
tion, are key drivers in sanctioning norm violators (Rabin, 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Pedersen et al., 2013). Al-
though these motives are not mutually exclusive (i.e., violations
of fairness can induce emotional arousal), neuroimaging evi-
dence can help in formalizing the specific role of fairness prefer-
ences and negative emotions in punishment. Indeed, previous
studies suggest that these motivational processes are linked with
different brain regions. Perceived unfairness has been consistently
associated with activation of anterior insula (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et
al., 2013; Zhong et al., 2016), whereas the amygdala has been
associated with negative arousal (Gospic et al., 2011; Treadway et
al., 2014). To disentangle the role of fairness preferences and
negative arousal in punishment, we developed a computational
model of punishment decision-making. This formal model al-
lowed us to estimate individual parameter values reflecting indi-
viduals’ willingness to punish, as well as the subsequent severity
of their punishment.
Additionally, there has been much recent interest in the role of
hormones in cognition (Rilling et al., 2012), in particular oxyto-
cin. Many studies first demonstrated oxytocin as promoting spe-
cifically prosocial behavior, but recent work has suggested a more
complex role (Ma et al., 2016), potentially also relevant to nega-
tive, punishment, behavior (Krueger et al., 2013; Daughters et al.,
2017). Therefore, our final aim was to explore the role of oxytocin
in both compensation and punishment contexts in response to
norm violations. We were particularly interested in whether oxyto-
cin impacted punishment differently in second- and third-party
contexts, and what neural mechanism might underlie these effects. If
oxytocin impacted responses to norm violations, this would suggest
that oxytocin is involved in social behavior more generally, po-
tentially playing a role in shifting focus from self-interest to group
norms (De Dreu and Kret, 2016).
Materials andMethods
To achieve these multifaceted goals, we used an exploratory and multi-
methodological approach. We combined functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) with a pharmacological intervention of oxytocin, and
developed a novel experimental decision-making task termed the Justice
Game. We recruited 55 males (28 oxytocin) for a randomized, double-
blind, placebo-controlled between-subject experimental design. One
participant in the oxytocin group was excluded because he reported not
performing the task seriously, and therefore behavioral analyses were
conducted with 54 participants (mean age 21.2 years, SD 2.4 years;
27 oxytocin). Neuroimaging data and computational model analyses were
conducted with 53 participants (27 oxytocin), as neuroimaging data of one
participant in the oxytocin group was lost due to technical problems.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants provided informed consent
and received instructions about the task. Participants received a standard
payment of €35 for participation plus an additional bonus payment of
between €7 and €15 based on their decisions (average earnings of €47,
SD €1.29). Exclusion criteria for participation were significant medical
or psychiatric illness, medication, smoking more than five cigarettes per
day, or drug/alcohol abuse. Participants were instructed to refrain from
smoking, eating, and drinking (except for water) for 3 h before the
experiment, and all were tested in the afternoon to minimize effects of
circadian rhythm. The experiment was approved by the local university
ethics committee.
At the start of the experiment, participants completed several practice
trials, and were subsequently quizzed to check whether instructions had
been understood correctly. Next, they self-administered the medication
(Syntocinon spray, Novartis; 24 IU; 3 puffs per nostril, each with 4 IU of
either oxytocin or placebo) under experimenter supervision. To avoid
pharmacological effects other than those caused by oxytocin, the placebo
contained all active ingredients with the exception of the neuropeptide.
While in the MRI scanner, participants completed one unrelated task
before beginning the present task. About 40 min (M 41.5, SD 21.7)
after substance administration (depending on how quickly participants
completed the previous task), participants started with the experiment of
interest. This timing conforms to other studies showing that effects of
oxytocin are present between 30 and 60 min after intranasal administra-
tion (Baumgartner et al., 2008; De Dreu et al., 2010, 2011; Stallen et al.,
2012). At both the beginning and the end of the experiment (after oxy-
tocin/placebo administration and task completion), participants com-
pleted a questionnaire to assess their perceptions of fairness and to
enhance the credibility of the task. Participants were told that the actions
they witnessed in the experiment reflected questionnaire answers given
by fellow participants whose final payment depended on participants’
choices in the experiment.
The Justice Game
The Justice Game allows us to measure participants’ responses to norm
violations concerning distributional fairness in terms of both punish-
ment and compensation, and was specifically designed for use in an MRI
environment (Fig. 1). In contrast to studying individuals’ willingness to
reject unfair offers, as is often done in the study of punishment behavior
(Feng et al., 2015), the Justice Game examined how people perceive and
respond to a situation in which a third-party deliberately (and unjustly)
takes resources from either oneself or someone else. Experimental work
in economics has shown that this deliberate act elicits very negative emo-
tions in the person from whom the resources are taken, and that this is
typically experienced as a stronger norm violation than receiving an un-
fair share of resources (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et
al., 2007; Korenok et al., 2014), hence our use of this manipulation.
The Justice Game is a single-shot game involving two players, one of
whom is randomly assigned the role of Taker. At the start of the game,
both the Taker and the Partner receive an endowment of 200 chips. The
Taker is then given the opportunity to take chips from the Partner and
add these chips to his own endowment, or he can choose to leave the
distributions as they are. The Taker can take a maximum of 100 chips
from the Partner. However, after the Taker has indicated his decision, the
Partner is given the option of punishing the Taker by spending chips
of his own. For each chip the partner spends, the income of the Taker is
reduced by 3 chips. Thus, punishment in this task is both costly and
effective. The Partner can use a maximum of 100 chips from his own
endowment for punishment purposes.
Participants played three conditions of the Justice Game: second-party
punishment games, third-party punishment games, and third-party
compensation games. The second-party punishment games were identi-
cal to the Justice Game as described above, with participants always
assigned to the role of Partner. In third-party punishment games, partic-
ipants were assigned the role of Observer, where they watched a Taker
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decide whether to take chips from another participant playing the role of
Partner. In this role as Observer, the participant also received an endow-
ment of 200 chips at the beginning of each game. Following the decision
of the Taker to either take chips or not, the Observer had the option of
punishing the Taker for his action toward the Partner. Observers could
use a maximum of 100 chips from their endowment for punishment
purposes. Each punishment chip spent by the Observer decreased the
income of the Taker by 3 chips. Observers did not know whether the
Partner had also punished the Taker or not. Finally, third-party compen-
sation games were identical to the third-party punishment games, except
that in third-party compensation games the Observer had the option of
compensating the Partner (as opposed to punishing the Taker). One chip
spent by an Observer in third-party compensation games increased the
income of the Partner by 3 chips.
The identity of Takers was never revealed to the participants, and on
each trial they were told they were paired with different Takers. Thus, all
games were anonymous, independent, and single-shot. Furthermore, we
emphasized to participants that they should make decisions based on
their own preferences, and that the punishment of the Taker would be
based on the decision of one player only. Therefore, participants should
punish a Taker even if they thought that another player would also pun-
ish this Taker. To control the number of trials of interest for neuroimag-
ing analyses, Takers’ choices were preprogrammed. Half of the trials were
programmed to be “fair” trials, in which the Taker did not take any chips
from the Partner. The other half of the trials consisted of “unfair” trials in
which the Taker took 25, 50, 75, or 100 chips from the Partner. For each
game type, there were 24 fair trials and 24 unfair trials, with 6 trials of
each unfair trial type (i.e., 6 trials in which a Taker took 25 chips, 6 trials
in which a Taker took 50 chips, etc.). To ensure participants experienced
punishment and compensation to be real and consequential, six trials
were randomly selected for payment, and participants were remunerated
accordingly at the end of the experiment.
Participants played 48 trials of each of the three conditions of the
Justice Game, resulting in 144 trials in total. Games and trial types were
randomized within each experiment. After the presentation of a fixation
screen (2–5 s), a start screen (2 s) appeared indicating the beginning of a
trial. This screen displayed the initial endowments of both the Taker and
the Partner (200 chips each), and its trial type (second- or third-party
punishment or third-party compensation). We avoided directly using
the terms “punishment” and “compensation” to prevent influencing in-
dividuals’ actual fairness norms (Pedersen et al., 2013). Instead, games
were introduced as “You-Other” games (second-party punishment games),
“Other-Other, You: Take” games (third-party punishment games), and
“Other-Other, You: Give” games (third-party compensation games). Next,
a screen was shown that revealed the decision of the Taker, i.e., the
number of chips the Taker actually took from the Partner (4 s). At the
conclusion of each trial, participants indicated the amount of chips they
wished to use to punish or compensate respectively on a response scale,
which consisted of a row of numbers from 1 to 100, in steps of 10 (6.5 s).
Responses were indicated by scrolling to the number of their choice and
pressing a confirmation button. The starting position of the scrolling
cursor was placed randomly on each trial. To ensure participants’ atten-
tion, three self-paced breaks were included. We assessed participants’
expectations about the task by asking them to report the number of chips
they expected a Taker to typically take from a Partner. This measure was
completed both before the administration of oxytocin/placebo, and
again at the conclusion of the experiment (M  1.5 h after treatment,
SD 6 min).
Neuroimaging data acquisition
For each participant, we acquired a T1-weighted MPRAGE high-
resolution image preceded by six functional scans. During the first two
functional scans, participants performed an unrelated decision-making
task. During functional scans 3– 6, participants played the Justice Game.
Functional scans were acquired using 5-shot multiecho planar imaging
GRAPPA (TR  2390 ms; TE1  9.4 ms, TE2  21.2 ms, TE3  33 ms,
TE4  45 ms, TE5  56 ms; matrix  64  64; FOV  224 mm; slice
thickness 3 mm; 31 axial slices; voxel size: 3.5 mm 3.5 mm 3.5 mm).
Neuroimaging data preprocessing
Images were preprocessed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/) and FSL 6.0 (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk). First, we combined sepa-
rate echoes, using a weighted image computed from scans 5–30 acquired
during the third functional run (first scan of the experiment). Subsequently,
images were corrected for slice acquisition delay (ascending procedure), re-
aligned to the mean image (6-parameter rigid body transformation), and
resliced to correct for motion artifacts. The high-resolution T1 image was
then coregistered to the mean functional image, and segmented into tissue
types. Parameters from segmentation were then used to normalize all
images to the MNI 152 brains template (12-parameter affine transforma-
tion). Functional scans were smoothed using an 8 mm Gaussian Kernel.
The resulting images were corrected for temporal autocorrelation using
an order 1 auto-regressive model, and periods longer than 100 s were
filtered out.
General linear model specifications neuroimaging data
We estimated two separate general linear models for the analyses of the
neural correlates associated with the perception and response to unfair-
ness. The first model focused on the unfairness of the Taker’s action and
modeled BOLD signal from subject i, run r, and voxel v using the follow-
ing equation (TAKER_model) :
yi,v,r  r  1  FAIRG1  2  UNFAIRG1  3  UNFAIRG1  AT
 4  SWG1  5  DWG1…  R  i. (1)
The TAKER_model focused on the 4 s window when participants were
informed how many chips had been taken by the Taker; namely 0, 25, 50,
75, or 100. We used two boxcar regressors to model this window: FAIR
(trials in which the amount taken 0) and UNFAIR (trials in which the
amount taken 0). We also used the actual amount taken per trial as a
parametric modulator for the UNFAIR boxcar regressor (UNFAIR 
AT). We included these three covariates for each game separately (total of
3 3 9 regressors). We also included a boxcar regressor modeling the
first window of each trial (SW; duration 2 s) regardless of game type,
and a boxcar regressor covering the decision window (DW; duration
reaction time). G1 indicates Game 1 (second-party punishment game).
The “…” indicates that we included the same covariates for Game 2
(third-party punishment game) and Game 3 (third-party compensation
game). R is a 6-column matrix with realignment parameters and  is the
Figure 1. Trial outline of a second-party punishment game in the Justice Game. In this second-party punishment sample trial, a Taker takes 100 chips from the participant and the participant can
decide howmuch, if any, chips hewants to spend on punishment. Fixation screen: 2–5 s; Start screen: 2 s; Taker decision: 4 s; Response screen: 6.5 s. The 4 s window indicating the number of chips
taken (Taker decision) was entered into the general linear models used for our fMRI data analysis.
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vector of coefficients that multiplies R. The TAKER_model was used to
explore the neural correlates of fairness and unfairness.
Given that the unfairness of the Taker’s action highly correlated with
the amount of punishment/compensation administered, we used a sec-
ond model to examine the neural correlates of decision-making sepa-
rately (SPEND_model). The SPEND_model modeled BOLD signal from
subject i, run r, and voxel v using the following equation:
yi,v,r  r  1  NSPNG1  2  SPNG1  3  SPNG1  AI  4
 FAIRG1  5  SWG1  6  DWG1…  R  i. (2)
In this equation, “NSPN” and “SPN” are dummy variables indicating
whether participants punished or compensated (SPN) or did not punish
or compensate (NSPN) in an unfair trial, i.e., when0 chips were taken.
“AI” is the amount of chips used for punishment and compensation and
is the parametric modulator for the regressor SPN. “FAIR” concerns the
4 s window of trials in which the amount of chips taken was 0. SW and
DW are the same dummy variables as in the TAKER model. Contrast
images for the contrast punishment versus compensation were com-
puted with 42 participants because coefficients for the parametric mod-
ulator could not be estimated when participants never, or only one time,
spent chips on punishment or compensation per functional run or when
participants consistently spent the same amount on punishment or com-
pensation per run. Contrast images for the contrast deciding to not pun-
ish versus deciding to punish included 20 participants, as punishment
amounts per run varied sufficiently in both second- and third-party
punishment games for 20 participants only.
We estimated both models using restricted maximum likelihood. The
SPEND_model is used to examine the neural correlates underlying the
decision to not respond to the violation and to compare punishment versus
compensation decisions. We analyzed the data using a two-level mixed-
effect general linear model. At the first level, we analyzed data from each
participant. Error due to separate functional runs was accounted for by a
fixed effect model. All covariates of interest in the models were convolved
with a double-gamma canonical hemodynamic response function. Ad-
ditionally, we included first derivatives for each covariate of interest. We
also included the six head-motion parameters as covariates of no-
interest.
Computational punishment model development and
estimation procedures
Our second aim was to better understand the neural correlates associated
with punishment decisions in particular. To this end, we fitted a formal
computational decision utility model to the behavioral punishment data.
This model aimed to disentangle the processes underlying participants’
willingness to punish and the severity of any subsequent punishment.
Formally, modeling participants’ decisions had three benefits. First,
parameters corresponding to individuals’ willingness to punish and the
severity of their punishment were calculated separately for second- and
third-party punishment games. This allowed us to assess the impact of
personal involvement (i.e., being hurt or observing someone else being
hurt) separately in both of the subcomponent processes. Second, this
approach enabled us to disentangle whether the effect of oxytocin on
punishment levels reflected a modulation of individuals’ decision to
punish, of their decision to punish harshly, or indeed of both. Third,
having distinct individual parameters for both the decision to punish and
the severity of punishment allowed us to examine the neural underpin-
nings of punishment decisions in a more specific manner than by use of
standard brain maps alone.
Our computational utility model incorporated two parameters. Pa-
rameter  represented the utility participants derive from punishment
relative to the utility they derive from keeping chips to themselves. This
value was constrained between 0 and 1, with values close to 1 reflecting a
high propensity to punish, and values close to 0 denoting participants
who rarely punish. Parameter  represented whether participants pun-
ished harshly in response to a violation (i.e., how eager is one to spend a
large number of chips to punish?). The contribution of this parameter to
the decision utility was conditional on parameter  being 0 (i.e., if
participants never punished, punishment amount is irrelevant). We for-
malized the model as follows, withUi being participant i’s decision utility
of spending chips on punishment (sp,i):
For individual i:
U isp,ii,k, i,k, st) (1	 i,k)
i  i,k f (sp,i, st, i,k), (3)
with:
f (sp,i, st, i,k) 	max(i,k st 	 sp,i, 0). (4)
The term st represented the number of chips originally taken by the
Taker, and the term 
 represented participant’s material payoff, with 

being 200 st sp for second-party games and 200 sp for third-party
games. The term k represented game type, with k being either second- or
third-party punishment game. Equation 4 shows how participants’ util-
ity is impacted by parameter k. If x chips are taken from the participant,
he will spend up to x chips to punish the taker, as this will maximize his
utility.
The decision of how much chips to spend on punishment depends on
how many chips participants have available after the Taker’s action.
Therefore, Ui(sp,ii,k, i,k, st) is subject to the constraint of sp,i 200 st
in second-party games and sp,i 200 st sp,i in third-party games.
The Utility model generates an optimal number of chips spent on
punishment, which we label sp,i*:
sp,i
*  arg max_x Ui[xi,k, i,k, st] subject to
x  200	 st in second-party games and
x  200 in third-party games, with x  {10, 20, …}. (5)
In Equation 5, sp,i* is the number of chips that optimizes participant i’s
utility. Note that sp,i* does not depend on the observed level of punish-
ment, sp,i, but rather on st and the participant-specific parameters k and
k. Parametersk and k are estimated by minimizing the sum of squared
errors, with t representing trial:
RSSk,t ti(sp,i,t 	 sp,i,t* )2 (6)
To assess whether our computational punishment model provided a
compelling representation of participants’ behavior, we compared it to
five other models. First, we assessed the prediction accuracy based on the
Nash equilibrium of both games, which is to never invest chips (Nash,
1951) and thereby reflects classical economic theory. Second, we tested
performance of Inequity Aversion model (AI), a prominent model of
social preferences that argues that people value equality and demonstrate
a preference that everyone receives the same amount, even if this is zero
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Finally, we estimated three versions of our
model, one that sets 3pp 2pp and 3pp 2pp; one that allows differ-
ent  values across games but same  values; and the model as presented
in the paper in which both parameters can differ between game types
(Model 4).
It is important to note that our goal here is not to test whether our
model is necessarily better or worse than the Nash equilibrium or the AI
model, but rather to assess the extent to which our model fits our data
relative to these alternative theories. Thus, we present these comparisons
to provide a reference point to evaluate model fit. Another advantage of
the development of the computational model is that this allows us to test
whether the willingness to punish and the decision of how severely to
punish are separable processes. In the experiment itself, participants
make only one decision (that is, a punishment choice of 0 –100 chips).
However, the output of the model will demonstrate whether these pro-
cesses are in fact separable, even though this process distinction is not
directly observable in the behavior itself. Furthermore, we believe that, in
principle, it is useful to define a model when trying to understand com-
plex behavior, such as responses to unfairness, as this model can poten-
tially be applied to other paradigms. Modeling behavior can therefore be
a principled way forward to better understand and represent responses to
unfairness in a broader context.
For all games, we computed parameters to minimize the residual sum
of squares (See Eq. 6). Parameters were estimated independently for each
Stallen et al. • Neural Mechanisms of Punishment and Compensation J. Neurosci., March 21, 2018 • 38(12):2944–2954 • 2947
participant. We started by constructing a coarse grid over the parameter
space to select the best initial estimates. Then, we used a constraint opti-
mization procedure implemented in MATLAB to obtain the final esti-
mates. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each model was
computed as follows:
AICM  2k	 2LL 2k(k 1)/(N	 k	 1), (7)
where LL is the log-likelihood for model M, k the number of parameters,
and N the number of observations. We computed LL using the estimated
utilities per each strategy and a softmax function. Although there are no
dramatic differences in the fit of the three versions of the model, Model 4
is the best performing (LL  162, AIC  333, R 2  0.68, accuracy 
46%; Table 1). Therefore, we used this parameterization to investigate
the motivations underlying punishment behavior.
Region-of-interest analyses for model parameters
With regard to the neural correlates associated with the model parame-
ters and the effect of oxytocin on parameter estimates, we were primarily
interested in brain areas that had been previously shown to play a key role
in processes associated with punishment decision-making. These pre-
specified brain regions included the amygdala, the anterior insula (AIns)
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Previous research
showed that the amygdala and the AIns were associated with the signaling
of fairness violations (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Zhong et al.,
2016), and the encoding of harm respectively (Buckholtz et al., 2008;
Gospic et al., 2011; Treadway et al., 2014), whereas the final determina-
tion of appropriate punishment actions has been suggested to critically
depend on the DLPFC (Knoch et al., 2006; Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2015;
Treadway et al., 2014; Zhong et al., 2016). We conducted our analyses
only on these three brain regions, as we had strong a priori hypothesis
about these areas in particular. Regions-of-interest (ROIs) in AINs and
DLPFC were defined using the MarsBaR toolbox for Statistical Paramet-
ric Mapping (SPM). AIns and DLPFC masks were created by centering 10
mm radius spheres at the peak of activation clusters reported previously
in the neuroimaging literature on social norm violations (Table 2) (San-
fey et al., 2003). The amygdala mask was based on the Automated Ana-
tomical Labeling (AAL) atlas.
Experimental design and statistical analysis
Our experimental design was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-
controlled between-subject design.
Analysis behavioral data. To assess whether punishment and compen-
sation behavior differed across game types and whether punishment
and/or compensation levels were impacted by oxytocin administration,
we conducted a 2 (treatment: placebo/oxytocin, between-subjects fac-
tor)  3 (game type: second-party punishment game/third-party pun-
ishment game/third-party compensation game, within-subjects factor)
repeated-measures multivariate ANOVA with participants’ mean levels
of punishment and compensation behavior as dependent variables. To
assess to what degree the magnitude of the norm violation impacted the
frequency and severity of punishment per game type, we conducted a 2
(treatment: placebo/oxytocin, between-subjects factor) 4 (number of
chips taken by Taker: 25/50/75/100 chips, within-subjects factor)  10
(number of chips spent per punishment or compensation: 10/20/30/40/
50/60/70/80/90/100, within-subjects factor) repeated-measures multi-
variate ANOVA for each game type with participants’ summed choices as
dependent variables. For all ANOVAs, Greenhouse–Geisser corrections
were used to correct for violations of sphericity if required, and partial 2
values are reported as a measure of effect size. To assess the effect of game
type and treatment on parameters of the computational model, two 2
(treatment: placebo/oxytocin, between-subjects factor) 2 (game type:
second-party punishment game/third-party punishment game, within-
subjects factor) repeated-measures multivariate ANOVAs were con-
ducted with participants’ parameter estimates ( or ) as the dependent
variable. Results of the self-report measures were analyzed using a 2 test.
Behavioral data were analyzed with IBM SPSS statistics software.
Analysis neuroimaging data.All neuroimaging data were analyzed with
SPM software. As explained above, we estimated two separate general
linear models for the analyses of the neural correlates associated with the
perception and response to unfairness. Neuroimaging results are re-
ported here using a common cluster-corrected threshold at p  0.05
familywise error (FWE) on the basis of an initial whole-brain voxelwise
threshold of p  0.001. Exceptions are when specific clusters of brain
activity are better visualized by using a more stringent whole-brain FWE
correction for multiple comparisons (for Neural correlates of fairness of
unfairness). Neural correlates of our model parameters were analyzed
using a priori defined ROIs. To explore the role of the amygdala, AIns,
and DLPFC in the decision to punish and in punishment severity, we
performed multiple regression analyses for second- and third-party
games separately. ROI activations were used as dependent variables in
SPM’s multiple-regression analysis, whereas model parameters, oxytocin
treatment, and the interaction between treatment and parameters, served
as predictors. Contrast values are reported to indicate effect size and
directionality of the effect. To directly compare correlations between
parameter estimates and ROI activity in the different game types, Pearson
r values were transformed into Z-scores, and these Z-scores were com-
pared using one-tailed tests for nonoverlapping correlations based on
dependent groups (Silver et al., 2004). Correlations were compared using
R’s package cocor (Diedenhofen and Musch, 2015).
Results
Results for decisions to punish violators and compensate
victims
First, we examined participants’ decision-making in the task, exploring
differences between punishment and compensation games, as well as the
effect of oxytocin on behavior.
Punishment and compensation. Repeated-measures multivariate ANOVAs
with participants’ mean levels of punishment and compensation behav-
ior as dependent variables, confirmed that participants were willing to incur
costs to both punish and compensate in response to unfairness, and also that
behavior differed across game types (F(2,51)  24.05, p  0.001, partial
 2 0.49). Specifically, participants were more likely to punish than to
compensate (t(53)  6.06, p  0.001) and were willing to spend more
chips in the second-party punishment condition (when they themselves
were victims) than in the third-party punishment condition (when
someone else was hurt; t(53)  5.99, p  0.001; Msecond punish  38.07,
SDsecond punish  23.55; Mthird punish  23.52, SDthird punish  18.47;
Mcomp  13.93, SDcomp  11.63; Fig. 2). Oxytocin administration did
not affect mean levels of punishment or compensation (F(1,52)  0.12,
p 0.742, partial  2 0.002).
Frequency and severity of punishment. To assess to what degree the
magnitude of the norm violation impacted the frequency and severity of
punishment, repeated-measures multivariate ANOVAs that assessed the
frequency of the various levels of punishment possible showed that,
across game types, the more that was taken from the victim, the more
chips were spent to either punish or compensate (second-party punishment
Table 2. MNI coordinates used to create 10mm spheremasks for ROI analyses
Brain region Hemisphere x y z
AIns R 39 18 4 Sanfey et al., 2003
AIns L 35 16 7 Sanfey et al., 2003
DLPFC R 39 37 22 Sanfey et al., 2003
DLPFC L 34 45 16 Sanfey et al., 2003
Table 1. Punishmentmodel summary and fit
Model No. of parameters RSS LL AIC R 2
Nash 0 92,511 1431 2862 NAN
AI 3 43,704 505 1017 0.303
Model 2 2 23,015 243 489 0.526
Model 3 3 19,170 198 403 0.616
Model 4 4 15,687 162 333 0.678
The column labeled RSS reports the average of the residual sum of squares across participants. LL indicates the
averageof the log-likelihoodacrossparticipant. AICwas computedperparticipantusingEquation7, and theaverage
is reported here. R 2 is the squared correlation coefficient between true and predicted response. NAN not a
number.
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game: F(27,26)  3.45, p  0.001, partial 
2  0.78; third-party punish-
ment game: F(27,26) 24.05, p 0.016, partial 
2 0.71; compensation
game: F(27,26) 2.41, p 0.013, partial 
2 0.69).
Effect of oxytocin. Interestingly, in the second-party punishment game,
participants in the oxytocin group administered low punishments more
often than participants in the placebo group (Punishment Amount 
Treatment: F(9,44)  2.10, p  0.050, partial 
2  0.30; Fig. 3). In the
third-party punishment game, this effect also emerged, but was further
qualified by the Taker’s behavior (Punishment Amount  Treatment 
Amount of chips taken: F(27,26)  2.34, p  0.017, partial 
2  0.71).
Thus, when participants observed someone else being hurt, the effect of
oxytocin on punishment was stronger as the norm violation increased
(when more was taken; Fig. 4). Self-report measures that were adminis-
tered both before and after the experiment and assessed participants’
beliefs about what behavior they expected from the other players, showed
that participants who received oxytocin expected fair treatment more
often than did participants in the placebo group. Specifically, 12 of 27
participants in the oxytocin group changed their beliefs after treatment,
now expecting other players to take no chips at all, whereas only 3 of 27
participants in the placebo group changed their expectations ((1)
2 
7.45, p 0.006).
Neuroimaging results
First, we examined the neural correlates of the
perception of both fairness and unfairness in
the Justice Game to compare our findings with
previous reports in the literature on social
norm violations. For these analyses, we col-
lapsed across punishment and compensation
conditions. Next, we explored the neural pro-
cesses underlying responses to social norm vi-
olations as per our first aim, and report the
neural activity underlying punishment versus
compensation (findings for the opposite con-
trast were absent), as well as the neural corre-
lates associated with the decision to refrain
from either punishment or compensation in
response to a violation. For these analyses,
we collapsed across second- and third-party
punishment conditions, and because oxyto-
cin treatment had no effect on mean punish-
ment and compensation levels, results here
are additionally collapsed over treatment.
Neural correlates of second- and third-party
punishment were examined by exploring
correlations between the computational mo-
del parameter estimates and the brain activ-
ity in the AINs, amygdala, and DLPFC.
Neural correlates of fairness and unfairness.
Brain regions that showed greater activity for
fairness versus unfairness were the ventral
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), posterior
insula, posterior cingulate, and superior tem-
poral sulcus (Table 3; Fig. 5; p  0.05, FWE
whole-brain corrected; contrasting trials in
which the Taker took no chips vs trials in which
chips were taken). Brain regions that correlated
with the degree of unfairness were the AIns,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), DLPFC, pre-
cuneus and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(VLPFC; Table 3; Fig. 6; p 0.05, FWE whole-
brain corrected; contrasting trials in which the
Taker took chips vs trials in which no chips
were taken, with activity correlating with the
number of chips taken). When examining
brain activity correlating with the amount of
punishment or compensation administered,
we found that activation in these areas also cor-
related positively with decision-making. That
is, the higher the activation in this network, the
more punishment and compensation was subsequently administered
(p  0.05, FWE whole-brain corrected; Table 4; contrasting trials in
which participants punished/compensated vs trials in which participants
did not punish/compensate, with activity correlating with the amount of
punishment/compensation administered). These findings align well with
previous neuroimaging work on fairness and unfairness, providing sup-
port for the validity of our novel task (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al.,
2008; Harle´ et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2015).
Neural correlates of punishment versus compensation. Comparing brain
activity for punishment versus compensation showed higher activity in
ventral striatum for punishment decisions (initial threshold set at p 
0.001 uncorrected, cluster corrected at p 0.05 FWE, cluster of 57 vox-
els; Fig. 7A; Table 5; contrasting trials in which punishment is adminis-
tered in second- and third-party punishment games vs trials in which
compensation is administered).
Neural correlates of deciding not to punish. The decision to refrain from
punishing in response to unfairness was associated with enhanced activ-
ity in the temporal parietal junction (TPJ; initial threshold set at p 
0.001 uncorrected, cluster corrected at p 0.05 FWE, cluster of 60 vox-
Figure 2. Mean amount of chips spent as a function of game type and number of chips taken by the Taker. Error bars are SEM.
n 54.
Figure 3. Frequency of punishment in the second-party punishment games. Participants in the oxytocin group administered
smaller punishments (10–50 chips) more often than participants in the placebo group. Error bars are SEM. n 54.
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els; Fig. 7B; Table 5; contrasting decisions to not punish vs decisions to
punish in second- and third-party punishment games).
Results for computational modeling of second- and
third-party punishment
Parameter : willingness to punish. Repeated-measures ANOVA with
game type as a within-subject factor and treatment as a between-subject
factor, demonstrated that estimates of  did not differ between second-
and third-party punishment games (F(1,51) 0.91, p  0.345, partial
 2  0.02; second-party punishment: range  0.45– 0.9, mean  0.65,
SD  0.13; third-party punishment: range  0.45– 0.9, mean  0.64,
SD  0.14). However, there was an interaction between game type and
treatment, with estimates of  significantly higher in second-party games
for participants receiving oxytocin compared with placebo (F(1,51) 4.5,
p 0.034, partial  2  0.09; Fig. 8A). Oxytocin administration did not
affect estimates of  in third-party games, suggesting that oxytocin might
impact the decision to punish only when one is hurt directly. In third-
party game types the correlation between and was0.63 (p 0.001).
As expected, this correlation is negative: when people punished fre-
quently they were less likely to punish severely.
Parameter: severity of punishment.Repeated-measures ANOVA for
yielded a main effect of game type, indicating that participants valued
harsher punishments more in second-party games (F(1,51)  6.4, p 
0.015, partial  2  0.11; second-party punishment: range  0.10 –1.9,
mean  0.75, SD  0.41; third-party punishment: range  0.10 –1.1,
mean 0.60, SD 0.31). Additionally, there was a main effect of treat-
ment on , with estimates for both second- and third-party games sig-
nificantly lower for participants in the oxytocin versus placebo group
(F(1,51)  8.4, p  0.006, partial 
2  0.14; Fig. 8B). This main effect
echoes the earlier reported behavioral finding showing that oxytocin
administration impacted the administration for low punishments in par-
ticular, an effect that was present for both game types. In second-party
game types the correlation between  and  was0.27 (p 0.049).
Neuroimaging results
Our second aim was to gain greater understanding of the subcomponent
processes underlying punishment in second- and third-party contexts.
To this end, we examined whether brain activity in the AIns, DLPFC, and
amygdala was associated with individual parameter estimates obtained
from our computational punishment model.
Second-party punishment. For second-party punishment games, brain
maps used contrasted unfairness (amount of chips taken) versus fairness
in second-party punishment games. Results showed that individual esti-
mates of parameter  correlated with a significant increase in activity in
bilateral AIns (right AIns: t 3.75, p 0.001, contrast value 5.59; left
AIns: t 1.87, p 0.034, contrast value 2.94), but not with activity in
Figure 4. Frequency of punishment in third-party punishment game. y-axis, Percentage of trials; x-axis, number of chips spent per punishment.A, Taker takes 25 chips; (B) Taker takes 50 chips;
(C) Taker takes 75 chips; and (D) Taker takes 100 chips. Error bars indicate SEM. Themore chips the Taker takes, the stronger the effect of oxytocin on the administration of smaller punishments.
n 54.
Table 3. Significant activation clusters associated with the perception of fairness
and unfairness
Brain region Hemisphere x y z No. of voxels Z
Clusters correlating with fairness (no chips taken) vs unfairness (amount of chips taken0)
—VMPFC R 10 53 10 355 6.04
—Posterior insula L 53 24 22 468 6.65
—Posterior insula R 52 4 4 96 6.34
—Posterior cingulate L 11 24 46 145 6.65
—Superior temporal sulcus L 60 20 10 96 5.99
Clusters correlating with unfairness (amount of chips taken on unfair trials) vs fair trials
—ACC R 3 39 25 576 7.77
—VLPFC L 46 42 8 249 7.8
—DLPFC L 36 25 42 (same cluster as
L VLPFC)
5.94
—VLPFC R 45 46 8 411 6.93
—AIns R 48 22 6 (same cluster as
R VLPFC)
6.6
—Precuneus R 6 76 42 553 6.87
—Cerebellum L 39 62 34 2055 7.62
—Occipital cortex L 53 66 6 (same cluster as
cerebellum)
7.52
p 0.05, FWE whole-brain corrected.
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the amygdala or DLPFC. Oxytocin administration increased activity in
the right AIns (t  1.69, p  0.049, contrast value  2.69). No neural
activity correlated with individual estimates of parameter , nor with
interactions between treatment and estimates of  or .
Third-party punishment. For third-party punishment games, brain maps
used contrasted unfairness (amount of chips taken) versus fairness in
third-party punishment games. Results showed that individual estimates
of parameter  activity correlated with an increase in activity in the right
DLPFC (t 2.12, p 0.019, contrast value 3.61) and right AIns (right:
t 1.65, p 0.05, contrast value 4.18). Individual estimates of param-
eter correlated with an increase of activity in the left amygdala (t 1.80,
p  0.039, contrast value  2.19). Oxytocin administration did not
significantly increase activity in the bilateral AIns in third-party punish-
ment games (left: t  1.60, p  0.058, contrast value  4.69; right: t 
1.55, p  0.063, contrast value  5.55), and there no neural activity
correlated with interactions between treatment and estimates of  or .
Correlation comparisons showed that the correlation between estimates of 
(willingness to punish) and right AIns, but not left AIns, was significantly stron-
ger insecond-partythanthird-partygametypes(rightAIns:Z1.91,p0.028;
rright AIns- second-party0.465, rright AIns- third-party0.171;leftAIns:Z0.842,
p  0.199, rleft AIns second-party  0.259, rleft AIns- third-party  0.121).
Correlations between estimates of  and left DLPFC were not signif-
icantly stronger in third-party compared
with second-party game types (Z  0.024,
p  0.510, rleft DLPFC- third-party  0.152,
rleft DLPFC- second-party  0.156). However,
the correlation between the amygdala and es-
timates of  (severity of punishment) were
significantly greater for third-party compared
with second-party punishment games (Z 
1.83,p0.033, rleft amygdala- third-party0.184,
rleft amygdala- second-party0.134).
Discussion
Our findings provide new insights into
the neural and psychological processes
of punishment and compensation in re-
sponse to social norm violations. We
developedanovelexperimentaldecision-
making task that elicited clear behav-
ioral responses to violations of fairness
norms, and that additionally allowed for
an investigation of the neural processes
underlying decisions about punishing
and compensating. Our findings align
clearly with previous reports on the
neural correlates of perceived fairness
and unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Tabibnia et al., 2008), and add several
new contributions to the burgeoning
neuroimaging literature on social norm
violations.
Punishment preferred to compensation
Our first aim was to understand better the neural mechanisms
underlying decisions to punish transgressors versus decisions to
compensate victims of a norm violation. We found that enhanced
ventral striatal activity was associated more strongly with decid-
ing to punish a player who behaved unfairly than to compensate
a player who had been disadvantaged. Although inferring psy-
chological processes from brain activity requires caution (Pol-
drack, 2011), the link between the ventral striatum and reward
processing has been well established in a recent meta-analysis of
200 neuroimaging studies (Bartra et al., 2013). Therefore, this
finding suggests that, in the present paradigm, punishment may
have been preferred over compensation, because punishment was
experienced as more rewarding. Indeed, the behavioral data showed
that participants preferred punishment above compensation.
Previous work on respective preference for compensation and
punishment has yielded mixed results, with participants some-
times preferring punishment over compensation, whereas other
studies have demonstrated the reverse (Leliveld et al., 2012; Chavez
and Bicchieri, 2013; Hu et al., 2016). One potential explanation of
why participants largely preferred punishment here is that these
other studies have typically used variants of the Dictator or Ultima-
tum Game in which the fairness norm is violated by sharing re-
sources unequally. However, in the Justice Game the fairness norm is
violated by someone directly taking resources from you or someone
else. This may be experienced as a stronger norm violation than
unequal sharing (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et
al., 2007; Korenok et al., 2014), resulting in a stronger preference for
punishment over compensation, as observed here.
In addition to an increase in ventral striatal activity for pun-
ishment versus compensation decisions, we found that the deci-
sion to refrain from punishment was associated with increased
activity in the TPJ, an area associated with perspective-taking
Figure 5. Neural correlates of fairness: trials inwhich Taker took no chips versus trials inwhich chipswere taken.MNI slice: left,
x8; right, z 4. Displayed at p 0.05 FWE whole-brain corrected. n 53.
Figure6. Neural correlates of unfairness: trials inwhich Taker took chips versus trials inwhichno chipswere taken,with activity
correlating with the number of chips taken. MNI slice: left, x 46; right, x4. Displayed at p 0.001 corrected. n 53.
Table 4. Significant activation clusters correlating with amount punished/
compensated
Brain region Hemisphere x y z No. of voxels Z
Clusters correlating with amount of punishment/compensation
ACC R 3 42 25 93 5.61
VLPFC L 46 42 11 46 5.83
VLPFC R 45 46 11 43 5.76
Precuneus R 6 70 50 56 5.42
Superior parietal cortex R 52 42 50 43 6.43
Superior parietal cortex L 53 42 46 205 6.04
Parieto-occipital sulcus R 52 66 22 58 5.24
Cerebellum L 36 70 31 122 5.95
Cerebellum R 34 70 34 122 5.41
p 0.05, FWE whole-brain corrected.
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(Carter and Huettel, 2013). Interestingly,
whereas in our study this TPJ activity was
associated with decisions to refrain from
punishment, other studies have found the
TPJ to be involved in a mentalization pro-
cess supporting punishment decisions
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; Krueger et al.,
2014; Treadway et al., 2014; Ginther et al.,
2016; Hu et al., 2016). These contradic-
tory findings are likely due to differences
in experimental design, with earlier work
focusing on hypothetical criminal scenar-
ios in which the perceived intent of the
wrongdoer was manipulated.
Dissociable neural correlates for
punishment decision and
punishment severity
Our second aim was to compare the psychological motives and
associated brain activity underlying the decision of whether to
punish, and then of how severely to punish, across both second-
and third-party punishment contexts. First, and importantly,
results from our computational model support the notion of
dissociable processes involved in punishment, comprising an ini-
tial decision to punish, followed by a subsequent choice of how
severely to punish. Specifically, examining the neural correlates
of the model-derived parameters demonstrates that the AIns was
related to the decision to punish, with this correlation stronger in
second-party compared with third-party
punishment scenarios. Given the role of
this brain area in the signaling of social
norm violations (Gu¨rog˘lu et al., 2010;
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Zhong et
al., 2016), a reasonable interpretation is that
individuals’ willingness to punish depends on
their fairness considerations, with individ-
uals’ fairness preferences being stronger
when one was directly involved than when
another person was the victim. In third-
party punishment cases, when partici-
pants were not themselves direct victims
of injustice, results showed that the deci-
sion to punish was also associated with
enhanced activity in the DLPFC. How-
ever, this correlation was only present in
the regression analysis when the correlation between estimates of
 and DLPFC activity were controlled for the effects of other
variables, including the effect of treatment and estimates of pa-
rameter . A comparison of correlations across games between 
and DLPFC activity directly showed that this relationship was not
significantly stronger in third-party as opposed to second-party
punishment games. Future research using larger sample sizes
could productively investigate the involvement of the DLPFC in
third-party contexts in more detail. The DLPFC is known for its
role in integrating information and response selection (Rid-
derinkhof et al., 2004), and previous work on third-party punish-
ment in hypothetical criminal contexts has found this area
involved in integrating information about the responsibility of
the wrongdoer and the amount of harm done (Buckholtz et al.,
2015). Possibly therefore, pure fairness considerations (as repre-
sented here by model-derived AIns activation) play a decisive role
in second-party punishment situations, whereas additional con-
textual information is integrated in punishment decisions in
third-party contexts, when others are harmed (possibly involving
the DLPFC). In third-party scenarios, we additionally found the
amygdala associated with the willingness to punish severely, a
finding that resonates with previous work showing that amygdala
activity correlated with punishment severity in hypothetical
crime scenarios, supporting the hypothesis that the amygdala
encodes affective arousal associated with harm done to someone
else (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Krueger and Hoffman, 2016).
Oxytocin enhances a “corrective” punishment
The third aim was to explore the role of the neuropeptide oxyto-
cin in compensation and punishment decisions. Decisions to
compensate victims, along with their neural correlates, were un-
affected by oxytocin. These results therefore do not support the
notion of oxytocin as a general enhancer of empathy and proso-
cial, altruistic, decisions (Bartz et al., 2011). As we had a relatively
little amount of compensation behavior, lack of oxytocin effects
on compensation may be due to restriction of range. However,
Figure 7. Brain contrast maps displayed at p  0.001 uncorrected. A, Punishment versus compensation: trials in which
participants invested in second- and third-partypunishment contrastedwith trials inwhichparticipants invested in compensation;
y 14 (MNI). n 42.B, Not punishing in response to unfair treatment: trials inwhich the Taker took chips and participants chose
to not punish versus trials in which the Taker took chips and participants punished; x49 (MNI). n 20.
Figure 8. Mean parameter estimates per game type. A, Means of parameter  reflecting the decision to punish. B, Means of
parameter reflecting the decision to punish hard. Error bars indicate SEM. n 53.
Table 5. Significant activation clusters associated with punishment versus
compensation decisions and the decision to not punish
Brain region Hemisphere x y z No. of voxels Z
Clusters correlating with the decision to punish (second- and third-party punishment
trials) versus the decision to compensate
—Ventral striatum R 14 18 6 57 3.94
—Occipital cortex R 17 70 3 125 4.32
Clusters correlating with the decision to not punish (second- and third-party punishment
trials) versus the decision to punish
—Temporal Parietal Junction L 42 42 18 60 3.86
Initial whole-brain threshold at p 0.001 uncorrected and cluster corrected at p 0.05 FWE.
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with regard to punishment decisions, oxytocin had a systematic
effect at both the behavioral and neural levels.
Behaviorally, oxytocin enhanced the frequency of small pun-
ishments by lowering individuals’ willingness to punish harshly,
suggesting that oxytocin may underlie a corrective response to
norm violations; that is, enhance the decision to give a “slap on
the wrist” to an offender when they behave (moderately) badly. We
speculate that oxytocin could therefore impact more “cognitively-
based” vigilant punishment behavior, as opposed to operating via
an affective response to a transgression, for example one based on
anger or fear. Results from the computational model revealed
that oxytocin administration decreased participants’ willingness
to punish harshly in both second- and third-party punishment
games. In second-party punishment games, oxytocin also im-
pacted participants’ decision to punish, suggesting there may not
be a one-to-one mapping between parameter  and sensitivity to
unfairness, but that the final decision to punish may also depend
on other factors, such as whether one is hurt directly. Neurally,
oxytocin enhanced activity in the AIns in second- and third-party
punishment games, though only significantly in the former. Given
the role of the AIns in signaling fairness violations (Gu¨rogˇlu et al.,
2010; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Zhong et al., 2016), these
results suggest that one potential mechanism for oxytocin to im-
pact punishment is that via subtly altering fairness preferences.
Indeed, results of self-report measures suggest that oxytocin in-
fluenced participants’ fairness expectations in consistent ways.
However, an interaction between  and game type, as was ob-
served at the behavioral level, was not present in the AIns. To find
significant interactions between treatment and parameter corre-
lates at the neural level larger sample sizes may be required.
The finding that oxytocin impacted punishment in both
second- and third-party games is difficult to reconcile with the
idea of oxytocin motivating direct retaliation, defined as prefer-
entially punishing when you yourself are harmed. Rather, our
findings better fit the hypothesis that oxytocin upregulates a mo-
tivation to create and maintain fairness vis-a`-vis direct interac-
tion partners (Daughters et al., 2017). Seen as such, our results
provide evidence for the hypothesis that oxytocin shifts the focus
from self-interest to overarching, normative, group interests (De
Dreu and Kret, 2016).
In sum, we developed a novel behavioral task and a new com-
putational model of punishment that allowed us to study both the
psychological and neural mechanisms underlying punishment
and compensation in response to norm violations. The present
findings not only provide more insight into the fundamental
brain mechanisms underlying punishment and compensation,
but also demonstrate how combining a computational approach
with neuroimaging methods can help disentangling the psycho-
logical motives underlying complex decision-making processes.
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